Diamond in the Rough: Mining Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations for an Individual Right to Due Process by Whitesell, Brittany P.
WHITESELL FINAL.DOC 6/6/2005 10:38 AM 
 
DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH: MINING ARTICLE 
36(1)(B) OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
CONSULAR RELATIONS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
BRITTANY P. WHITESELL 
Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye were 
strangers in the land of Egypt.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—a multilateral 
treaty signed by the president and ratified by the Senate2—delineates 
the rights of nations to conduct consular relations.3 Consular relations 
are the means by which nations protect the interests of their citizenry 
abroad, especially their nationals who are arrested for violating other 
nations’ criminal laws.4 The right to assist citizens charged with crimes 
abroad appears in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Article 
36(1)(a) provides that countries may access and communicate with 
their citizens,5 and Article 36(1)(b) provides that, upon detention, 
foreign nationals must be informed that their consuls may assist 
them.6 Foreign nationals have contended that the Article 36(1)(b) 
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 1. Exod. 22.21 (King James).  
 2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 3. See generally id. 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING 
FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO 
ASSIST THEM 42 (n.d.), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNA_book.pdf.  
 5. Article 36(1)(a) provides: “[C]onsular officers shall be free to communicate with 
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall 
have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of 
the sending State.” Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 
U.N.T.S. at 292.  
 6. Article 36(1)(b) provides:  
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without 
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a 
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language bestows upon them an individual right to consular 
notification.7 Foreign nationals have generated voluminous litigation 
in United States federal courts and international tribunals, invoking 
Article 36(1)(b) to argue that their convictions should be overturned 
because American law enforcement authorities never informed them 
that they could receive assistance from their consuls.8  
These legal challenges turn on whether Article 36(1)(b), as a 
treaty provision, confers rights upon individual foreign nationals or 
only upon consuls. Beyond the “individual right” versus “consular 
right” determination, the legal challenges also hinge on the scope of 
the purported individual right. The Article 36(1)(b) right could be a 
fundamental right that, if violated, would flaw convictions and 
mandate their reversal.9 Alternatively, the Article 36(1)(b) right could 
 
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or 
is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post 
by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the 
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph. 
Id.  
 7. See infra notes 63–69, 75–96 and accompanying text.  
 8. See, e.g., Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 562 (2003) (refusing to hear a foreign 
national’s claim that his death sentence should be overturned because of a Vienna Convention 
violation); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (considering whether a foreign national’s 
execution should be stayed because he had not been notified about the Vienna Convention); 
United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2001) (considering a foreign 
national’s Vienna Convention claim); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir. 
2001) (same); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); 
United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Standt v. City of 
New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 
55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 75 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 740 
(D.V.I. 1999) (same); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 471–74 (June 27) (considering 
Germany’s claim that its citizens’ rights under the Vienna Convention were violated); Memorial 
of Mexico (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena and Other Mexican Nationals) 1 (June 20, 
2003) [hereinafter Memorial of Mexico] (same), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm. 
 9. Some fundamental rights violations may not mandate automatic reversals of 
convictions. Under American law, this remedy is unavailable when violations so insignificantly 
impact cases that the convictions may stand consistently with the United States Constitution. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The Constitution only requires automatic 
reversals of convictions when the violations of fundamental rights harm the defendants. Id. 
Defendants must show some prejudice—but presumably less prejudice than required when a 
nonfundamental right is violated—to trigger automatic reversals of their convictions. See id. 
This prejudice standard also applies indirectly in international law: when a country violates a 
fundamental right, that country’s own standards of review and reconsideration supply the 
remedy. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514 (“I]t would be incumbent upon the United States to 
allow the review and reconsideration . . . by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth 
in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice of means must 
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be a nonfundamental right that, if violated, would mar convictions 
only if the violations prejudiced the defendants. These inquiries into 
whether Article 36 confers an individual right and, if so, whether the 
right is fundamental are the focus of Article 36(1)(b) litigation.10  
These are also the focus of this Note. This Note argues that 
Article 36(1)(b) does create an individual right that foreign nationals 
may invoke to challenge their convictions,11 and this right may be 
fundamental under domestic law. In other words, this Note maintains 
that the right to consular notification is a strong candidate for 
fundamental status and that violation of this right should prompt a 
demanding substantive due process inquiry,12 which courts and 
commentators have thus far been reluctant to conduct. 
In suggesting that Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right that 
may be fundamental, the Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I 
examines Article 36 jurisprudence from international tribunals and 
the United States federal courts, highlighting disagreements about the 
existence of an individual right in Article 36(1)(b) and agreement 
about the nonfundamental nature of the purported individual right. 
Part II undertakes a conventional treaty interpretation of Article 
36(1)(b) to argue that the provision creates an individual right. Part 
III considers the scope of this individual right, arguing that, under a 
substantive due process analysis, the right to consular notification 
should merit recognition as fundamental. Specifically, this Part 
marshals evidence about the history of consular relations in the 
United States to show that the right to consular notification could 
survive on the history, tradition, and practice prong of the substantive 
due process inquiry. Part III also presents alternative arguments that 
litigants could make to demonstrate that the right to consular 
notification is implicit in society’s modern conception of liberty. 
I.  ARTICLE 36(1)(B) JURISPRUDENCE 
Article 36(1)(b) claims have been litigated in domestic and 
international courts. Section A of this Part discusses interpretations of 
Article 36(1)(b) by international tribunals, namely the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
be left to the United States.”). Therefore, international law provides that the domestic 
convictions of foreign-national defendants will be reversed only with a showing of prejudice. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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(IACHR). Section B discusses interpretations by United States 
federal courts. 
A. The Interpretation of Article 36 by International Tribunals 
Nations whose citizens have been detained by other countries 
without notification that they could contact their consulates for 
assistance have brought Vienna Convention claims before 
international tribunals, alleging violations of both their own right to 
provide and their citizens’ right to receive consular assistance.13 These 
claims succeeded on both counts: the ICJ and the IACHR found 
violations of the nations’ and their citizens’ rights when the arresting 
state failed to notify the detained foreign nationals that Article 
36(1)(b) permitted them to seek aid from the consuls of their home 
countries.14 By equating the failure to notify foreign nationals that 
they could contact their consulates with a Vienna Convention 
violation, the ICJ and the IACHR read Article 36(1)(b) to provide 
detained foreign nationals an individual right to consular notification. 
Both tribunals considered the contours of this individual right but 
reached different conclusions.15 The ICJ twice refused to define the 
scope of the individual right to consular notification,16 whereas the 
IACHR opined that the right’s parameters were coterminous with the 
parameters of the right to due process.17 This Section focuses first on 
the ICJ’s interpretations of Article 36(1)(b) and then turns to the 
interpretations of the IACHR. 
1. The International Court of Justice. The ICJ, the “the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations,”18 has heard two cases raising 
 
 13. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), para. 49 (Mar. 31, 2004) 
[hereinafter Avena Judgment], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm; 
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); The Right to Information on Consular 
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion 
OC-16/99, Oct. 1, 1999, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (1999) [hereinafter Advisory 
Opinion].  
 14. See infra notes 23–35, 37–44, 54–61.  
 15. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 18. U.N. Charter, art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1, 
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm.  
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Article 36(1)(b) claims.19 These claims were brought by states—
Germany20 and Mexico21—because the ICJ does not have jurisdiction 
to hear cases brought by individuals.22 Nonetheless, in deciding these 
state-to-state disputes, the ICJ defined the rights of individuals: 
because detained foreign nationals benefit from consular relations, 
the ICJ’s interpetation of how consular relations should be conducted 
under the treaty necessarily implicated a definition of foreign 
nationals’ rights.  
The ICJ considered whether Article 36(1)(b) confers an 
individual right upon foreign nationals or merely a right upon nations 
and their consuls in LaGrand.23 LaGrand involved two German 
nationals charged with murder, convicted, and sentenced to death in 
Arizona without ever being informed that they could contact the 
German consulate, even though the arresting authorities knew their 
nationality.24 In LaGrand, the ICJ held that foreign nationals possess 
an individual right to information about the Vienna Convention’s 
consular protections.25 The ICJ found this right in the express 
language of Article 36(1)(b), which provides that “[t]he [law 
enforcement] authorities shall inform the [foreign national] without 
delay of his rights under this subparagraph.”26 By its language, Article 
36(1)(b) requires countries that arrest foreign nationals to notify the 
detainees about the possibility of receiving assistance from their 
consulates.27 The right to notification and, by extension, the right to 
obtain consular assistance rise to the level of individual rights, 
 
 19. Int’l Court of Justice, List of Cases Brought Before the Court Since 1946, at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal).  
 20. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 21. Avena Judgment, supra note 13, at para. 49. 
 22. Int’l Court of Justice, General Information—The Court at a Glance, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal).  
 23. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).  
 24. Memorial of Germany (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (LaGrand) 9 (Sept. 16, 1999), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm. 
 25. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494 (“Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights . . . .”).  
 26. Id. (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 
U.N.T.S. at 292). 
 27. The referenced subparagraph details countries’ rights to assist their nationals detained 
abroad.
 
See id. (“The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his 
rights under this sub-paragraph.”). 
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according to the ICJ, because the text of Article 36(1)(b) explicitly 
defines the rights as such.28  
Furthermore, the ICJ found additional evidence in the text of 
Article 36 confirming that Article 36 bestows an individual right on 
foreign nationals.29 Under Article 36(1)(c), foreign nationals must 
consent before their consulates can be notified about their arrests.30 
Consequently, nations cannot exercise their rights to assist their 
nationals arrested abroad unless their nationals give them permission 
to do so.31 The ICJ deemed foreign nationals’ control over the 
operation of Article 36 to corroborate the existence of an individual 
right to consular notification.32 
Having concluded that “[t]he clarity of these provisions, viewed 
in their context, admits of no doubt” that Article 36 grants an 
individual right to foreign nationals,33 the ICJ did not define the 
nature of this right34—finding no need to define the right after 
determining that the right existed and had been breached by the 
United States.35 Consequently, the nature of the right that Article 36 
confers upon foreign nationals remained undefined under 
international law when the ICJ considered its next Vienna 
Convention case, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.36 
 
 28. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494. (“Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the 
following language: ‘The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his 
rights under this sub-paragraph.’” (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b), 21 
U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292)).  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. (finding that Article 36(1)(c)’s consent proviso, in conjunction with the “his 
rights” language in Article 36(1)(b), confers an individual right on foreign nationals). 
 33. Id.  
 34. See id.: 
  Germany further contended that the right of the individual to be informed without 
delay under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention was not only an 
individual right but has today assumed the character of a human right . . . . The Court 
having found that the United States violated the rights accorded by Article 36, 
paragraph 1, to the LaGrand brothers, it does not appear necessary to it to consider 
the additional argument developed by Germany in this regard.  
 35. Id. at 475–76, 494.  
 36. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), para. 49 (Mar. 31, 2004), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.  
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Defining the nature of this right was the primary issue presented 
to the ICJ by Avena.37 In Avena, Mexico brought a claim against the 
United States on behalf of fifty-four Mexican nationals sentenced to 
death in the United States.38 All of the prisoners maintained that 
American authorities had never informed them that they could 
contact the Mexican consulate for assistance in their criminal 
proceedings, and that their convictions were fatally flawed as a 
result.39 Although LaGrand bound only Germany and the United 
States in that particular case, and although the ICJ does not operate 
on the principle of stare decisis,40 both Mexico and the United States 
ascribed persuasive value to LaGrand in litigating Avena.41 Agreeing 
that Article 36 confers an individual right, the parties clashed over 
whether the right should be deemed a fundamental right,42 or even a 
 
 37. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 126 (arguing that “The Deprivation of 
Consular Notification and Assistance Renders Criminal Proceedings Fundamentally Unfair”); 
Counter-Memorial of the United States (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals) 121 (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial of the United States] 
(arguing that the Vienna Convention “Does Not Compel State Parties to Treat Article 36(1) as 
Creating Rights That Are Fundamental to Due Process”), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm. 
 38. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 1. 
 39. Id. at 38–39, 125.  
 40. See Int’l Court of Justice, A Guide to the History, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure 
and Decisions of the Court: The Decision, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ 
igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (“Since a decision of the Court affects the legal rights and interests solely of 
the parties to the case and only in that particular case, it follows that the principle of stare decisis 
(the binding nature of precedents) as it exists in Common Law countries has no place in 
international law.”). 
 41. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 93 (“Although the LaGrand judgment is 
binding only between the United States and Germany, the Court’s holding with respect to the 
‘obligations of the United States in cases of severe penalties imposed on [sic] German nationals’ 
who were not accorded their rights under Article 36 has clear relevance for Mexico, as well.” 
(quoting LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 517 (June 27))); Counter-Memorial of the 
United States, supra note 37, at 57 (“The LaGrand judgment sets forth the principles applicable 
to the dispute presented to the Court.”).  
 42. A fundamental right under international law is a right that countries must afford 
foreign nationals to comply with the minimum international standard—the international law 
equivalent of due process. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (7th rev. ed. 1997). The minimum international standard requires 
nations to treat foreign nationals within their territories in a civilized manner by adhering to 
myriad legal rules. Id. at 256, 260. Because the legal rules have attained varying degrees of 
acceptance from the international community, the content of the minimum international 
standard is disputed. Id. at 261. In general, however, countries fall below the minimum 
international standard by unlawfully violating foreign nationals’ physical integrity or by 
subjecting them to “the maladministration of justice.” Id. Specifically, and most germane to this 
Note, countries violate the minimum international standard by following judicial procedures 
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human right,43 under international law.44 Even though Mexico’s 
contentions directly presented to the ICJ the scope issue that the 
court had avoided in LaGrand, the ICJ again skirted the issue of 
whether “the right to consular notification . . . under the Vienna 
Convention is a fundamental human right that constitutes part of due 
process in criminal proceedings.”45 The ICJ maintained that the scope 
of the Vienna Convention right “[was] not a matter that this Court 
need[ed to] decide.”46 In dicta, however, the ICJ noted that the 
travaux préparatoires, text, object, and purpose of the Vienna 
Convention suggest that the Convention’s right to consular 
notification is not fundamental to due process.47 
2. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights. In an advisory 
opinion, the IACHR also weighed in on the interpretation of Article 
36(1)(b). The IACHR is a judicial organ created by the Organization 
of American States (OAS) to implement the American Convention 
on Human Rights,48 which created substantive human rights and 
procedures for effectuating them.49 To implement the American 
Convention, the IACHR was imbued with adjudicatory50 and  
advisory jurisdiction.51 All members of the OAS,52 including the 
 
that disadvantage foreign nationals. Id. Thus, the minimum international standard gives foreign 
nationals a fundamental right to fair judicial proceedings. See id. (noting ways to violate the 
minimum international standard through the “maladministration of justice”). 
 43. A human right under international law is a fluid and evolving concept; the term 
encompasses civil, social, and political rights, as well as constitutional rights recognized by 
Western democracies, such as the United States. Id. at 209–10. As a result, human right cannot 
be precisely, or coherently, defined. Id. Instead, the prevailing definition is little more than the 
statement of a theoretical ideal: human rights are inalienable and legally enforceable rights held 
by individuals that protect them from state interference and governmental power abuses. Id.  
at 209. 
 44. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 124–46 (arguing that Article 36(1)(b) creates 
a fundamental, or even a human, right under international law); Counter-Memorial of the 
United States, supra note 37, at 121–40 (arguing that Article 36(1)(b) does not create a right 
fundamental to due process under international law).  
 45. Avena Judgment, supra note 13, at para. 49. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 33, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 153. 
The United States, though a member of the OAS, is not a party to the Convention. 
 49. Id. arts. 3–25, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145–51. 
 50. Id. arts. 61–63, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159. 
 51. Id. art. 64, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159–60. 
 52. Id. art. 64, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 160. 
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United States,53 can seek advisory opinions about any treaty 
implicating human rights. Mexico exercised this right in requesting 
the IACHR to issue an advisory opinion on the Vienna Convention. 
Mexico asked the IACHR specifically to consider whether 
international conceptions of due process encompassed a right to 
consular notification.  
The IACHR was presented with the same facts that were before 
the ICJ in Avena—fifty-four Mexican nationals were sentenced to 
death in the United States and were never informed by the 
authorities that they could seek assistance from the Mexican 
consulate54—but the IACHR reached a different conclusion.55 In 
considering whether Article 36(1)(b) confers a fundamental right—a 
question that the ICJ avoided56—the IACHR concluded that it does.57 
The IACHR opined that consular notification enables foreign 
nationals to defend themselves better in criminal proceedings and 
that, because consular notification enhances their defenses, the right 
to consular notification is implicit in due process under international 
law.58  
Although the United States correctly stated that no other 
tribunal, domestic or international, had held that the right to 
notification about consular assistance “must be recognized and 
counted among the minimum guarantees essential to providing 
foreign nationals the opportunity to adequately prepare their defense 
and receive a fair trial,”59 the IACHR advisory opinion lends 
credence to the argument that international due process requires 
foreign nationals to receive notification about the Vienna 
Convention.60 The opinion also reflected international sentiment 
about the nature of the Article 36 individual right, given that seven 
 
 53. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2394, 119 
U.N.T.S. 48, 48. 
 54. Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 2.  
 55. See id. paras. 117, 122. 
 56. See id. para. 122 (defining the scope of the right to consular notification: classifying the 
right “among the minimum guarantees essential to providing foreign nationals the opportunity 
to adequately prepare their defense and receive a fair trial”).  
 57. See id. paras. 121–22 (asserting that due process under international law requires 
consular notification because foreign-national defendants are at a disadvantage in alien criminal 
justice systems). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 37, at 126–27.  
 60. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, 124–45 (arguing that Article 36(1)(b) creates a 
fundamental, or even a human, right). 
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countries submitted amici curiae briefs urging the IACHR to accord a 
foreign national’s Article 36(1)(b) right fundamental status.61 
B. The Interpretation of Article 36 by the United States Federal 
Courts 
Vienna Convention claims also have worked their way through 
the United States federal courts. Criminal defendants have raised 
Vienna Convention claims in district courts, in appeals to circuit 
courts, and in petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
Although interpreting these claims in contradictory manners, courts 
have consistently refused to grant criminal defendants relief on the 
basis of Article 36(1)(b). This Section first details the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of Article 36(1)(b) claims and then considers 
relevant decisions of the lower federal courts. 
1. The Supreme Court. In a federal habeas corpus case 
antedating LaGrand,62 the United States Supreme Court 
conspicuously left open the question of whether Article 36(1)(b) 
creates an individual right under American law.63 In Breard v. Green,64 
the Supreme Court, per curiam, denied a petition for certiorari from 
Paraguay and Breard, a Paraguayan national awaiting execution in 
Virginia.65 Because the Supreme Court denied the petition on 
procedural grounds, the Court never reached the Vienna Convention 
claims raised by Paraguay and Breard.66 The Court did state in 
dictum, however, that “[t]he Vienna Convention . . . arguably confers 
on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest.”67 
Although the Supreme Court did not definitively recognize that 
foreign nationals possess individual rights to consular notification, the 
Court’s statement indicated its inclination to do so when presented 
with a case requiring the resolution of the issue. 
The Supreme Court, however, denied itself the opportunity to 
act on this inclination by denying certiorari in a case brought by a 
 
 61. Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Paraguay submitted amici curiae briefs. Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 26. 
 62. See supra notes 23–35 and accompanying text.  
 63. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 64. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
 65. Id. at 378–79. 
 66. Id. at 375. 
 67. Id. at 376. 
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Mexican national convicted of murder in the United States without 
notification that the Vienna Convention made consular assistance 
available to him.68 In its Fall 2003 term, the Court refused to hear the 
Vienna Convention claim of Osbaldo Torres, one of the fifty-four 
Mexican nationals involved in the Avena case, because he had not 
raised his Vienna Convention claim in the trial court.69 Thus, the 
procedural default rule, which holds that defendants waive and 
 
 68. See Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 562 (2003) (refusing to hear a foreign national’s 
claim that his death sentence should be overturned because of a Vienna Convention violation). 
Although the Court avoided rendering its own interpretation of Article 36(1)(b), the Court 
granted certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke to decide whether to adhere to the ICJ’s interpretations 
of the provision. 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 
04-5928). In the Spring of 2005, the Court may decide whether to import the ICJ’s 
interpretations of Article 36(1)(b) by determining the effect on domestic law of the ICJ 
judgments in LaGrand and Avena. See Medellin v. Dretke, 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), petition 
for cert. filed, 2004 WL 2851246 (Aug. 18, 2004) (No. 04-5928) (presenting questions about 
whether the ICJ judgments should be treated as rules of decision or recognized under principles 
of comity and uniform treaty interpretation). Giving domestic effect to the ICJ’s interpretations 
of Article 36(1)(b) would equate to the domestic recognition of an individual right to consular 
notification. See Avena Judgment, supra note 13, at para. 49 (recognizing an individual right 
under Article 36(1)(b)); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27) (same). But 
the scope of the Article 36(1)(b) right will remain undefined because the ICJ failed to classify 
the right to consular notification as fundamental or nonfundamental under international law. Id. 
Furthermore, even if LaGrand or Avena had pronounced the scope of the right to consular 
notification under international law, the ICJ’s taxonomy would not determine the right’s scope 
under domestic law. Fundamental status under international law, although suggestive of the 
right’s importance to society, does not activate domestic constitutional protections. See infra 
Part III. Therefore, the scope of the Article 36(1)(b) right in domestic law will await definition 
even if the Court gives domestic effect to the ICJ judgments in Medellin. 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928).   
The prospect that Medellin will lead to the importation of international law created a 
domestic furor. In response to the grant of certiorari, President Bush withdrew the United 
States from the Optional Protocol that commits all disputes arising under the Vienna 
Convention to the compulsory juridiction of the ICJ. Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn 
From World Judicial Body,  N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16. As a result, the United States 
can no longer sue or be sued for Vienna Convention violations in the ICJ although the United 
States remains a party to the treaty. Id. The withdrawal from the Optional Protocol effectively 
prevents future cases like Avena and restricts foreign nationals whose Article 36(1)(b) rights 
were violated by the United States to domestic fora.  
In addition to withdrawing the United States from the Optional Protocol, President Bush 
issued an unprecedented memorandum instructing state courts to conduct the review and 
reconsideration required by the Avena judgment. Id. If the states follow President Bush’s order, 
the fifty-one Mexican nationals who were entitled to review and reconsideration under the ICJ 
judgment will receive new hearings to determine whether Vienna Convention violations led to 
their convictions.    
 69. Id.; Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals) 39 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus_iapplication_20030109.PDF. 
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cannot raise on appeal any legal claims that they failed to raise in the 
trial court, provided the Court with an excuse for avoiding the Article 
36(1)(b) issue.70  
Given that the Court has not yet recognized an individual right 
under Article 36(1)(b), it certainly has not pronounced the scope of 
such a right. The Breard Court did not intimate whether it would 
categorize the right that it indirectly acknowledged as fundamental or 
nonfundamental under domestic law.71 The Court did imply that the 
harmless error doctrine would apply to properly raised Vienna 
Convention claims72—that is, a court could reverse convictions for 
failure to inform foreign nationals of their right to consular assistance 
only if the nationals proved that such failure had contributed to their 
convictions.73 This intimation, however, did not at all suggest the 
 
 70. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375–76: 
By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, [the defendant] failed 
to exercise his rights under the Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of 
the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he 
cannot raise a claim of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review. 
Given the procedural default rule, the determination of whether Article 36(1)(b) confers 
an individual right may be distant: foreign nationals not informed about the Vienna Convention 
are unlikely to have sufficient knowledge to raise a Vienna Convention claim at trial and litigate 
it through the courts, which will permit the Supreme Court to use the procedural default rule to 
avoid deciding whether the Convention confers an individual right to consular notification. If 
the Supreme Court relies on the procedural default rule to avoid considering the issue on the 
merits, the Court will contravene Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 596 
U.N.T.S. at  292–94, and the ICJ’s judgments in LaGrand and Avena. Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. at para. 49; LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 
466 (June 27). Article 36(2) prohibits a state from applying its domestic law in a manner that 
denies full effect to the rights provided by the treaty, Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 596 
U.N.T.S. at 292–94, and the ICJ held in LaGrand that application of the procedural default rule 
violates Article 36(2). See 2001 I.C.J. at 497 (holding that the application of the procedural 
default rule to the specific facts violated Article 36(2)). Based on this breach, the ICJ held in 
Avena that the procedural default rule cannot bar review and reconsideration of convictions 
obtained in violation of the right to consular notification. 2004 I.C.J. at 51–52. Whether the 
Court will adhere to the ICJ’s judgments or follow domestic precedents that require application 
of the procedural default rule should be determined when the Court decides the effect of ICJ 
judgments on domestic law in Medellin v. Dretke. 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 
S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928). 
 71. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (acknowledging that the treaty may confer an individual 
right but failing to delineate the right’s parameters).  
 72. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (“[T]here may be some 
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and 
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not 
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”). 
 73. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 377 (“Even were Breard’s Vienna Convention claim properly 
raised and proved, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of 
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parameters of a right to consular notification: the harmless error 
doctrine can apply regardless of whether rights are fundamental or 
nonfundamental.74  
2. The Lower Federal Courts. Left without guidance from the 
Supreme Court about how to interpret the Vienna Convention, the 
lower federal courts have diverged on the meaning of Article 36. 
Some courts have interpreted the provision to create only consular 
rights, whereas others have held that it creates individual rights.75 Part 
A of this section discusses cases that typify the position that Article 
36(1)(b) does not create an individual right, whereas Part B discusses 
cases that typify the position that an individual right is created. 
Despite this split, the courts uniformly agree that such a right, if it 
does indeed exist, is not fundamental.76  
a. The Vienna Convention Does Not Confer an Individual Right. 
The interpretation of Article 36(1)(b) that denies the existence of an 
individual right is typified by United States v. Jimenez-Nava77—an 
appeal brought by a Mexican national who was convicted of 
possessing counterfeit immigration documents.78 Reasoning from 
principles of treaty law and interpretation, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the Vienna Convention bestows rights to conduct consular relations 
only on nations.79 The court explained that, because treaties must be 
interpreted consistently across the domestic laws of their signatories, 
international law presumes that treaties do not create individual 
 
a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the 
trial.”). 
 74. Id. at 377. 
 75. Compare United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
Article 36(1)(b) does not confer an individual right), with United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 
F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that Article 36(1)(b) does confer an individual 
right). Additionally, a third group of federal courts refuses to address the individual right issue 
directly; instead, they assume that Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right only as an 
intermediate step in deciding Vienna Convention cases on harmless error grounds. See, e.g., 
United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (assuming that Article 
36(1)(b) creates an individual right for the purpose of reaching a decision on the merits, and 
citing cases).  
 76. See, e.g., United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) (joining three 
other courts of appeals in disqualifying consular notification as a fundamental right). 
 77. 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 193. 
 79. Id. at 198. 
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rights.80 The Fifth Circuit looked to the plain language of the Vienna 
Convention for indications that Article 36(1)(b) was drafted to rebut 
this presumption by creating an individual right.81 According to the 
Fifth Circuit, the express language of the Convention’s preamble—
which states that the treaty “is not to benefit individuals”—barred any 
rebuttal of the presumption against finding the existence of individual 
rights.82 Based on this language and because the treaty’s purpose does 
not directly correspond to an individual right, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that Article 36(1)(b) confers no individual right.83 The 
court reached this decision notwithstanding evidence that “the State 
Department’s manual on the treatment of foreign nationals advises 
arresting officers to inform detainees of their right to consular 
communication.”84 Although recognizing that “[t]he State 
Department’s view of treaty interpretation is entitled to substantial 
deference,”85 the court regarded the State Department manual’s 
suggestion that arresting officers should inform detainees of their 
right to consular notification as an expression of “laudable 
determination to abide by the [Vienna Convention],” not as an 
acknowledgement that individuals may enforce the treaty in court.86  
b. The Vienna Convention Does Confer an Individual Right. 
The opposite conclusion was reached by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York when it considered 
Standt v. City of New York.87 Standt involved a section 1983 suit 
brought against police officers by a German national arrested for 
driving while intoxicated and without a driver’s license.88 The German 
national’s claim was premised on the Vienna Convention because the 
 
 80. See id. at 195 (“Treaty construction is a particularly sensitive business because 
international agreements should be consistently interpreted among the signatories. . . . 
[Consequently,] they do not generally create rights that are enforceable [by individuals] in the 
courts.”). 
 81. See id. at 196–97 (examining the language of the preamble and Article 36). 
 82. See id. at 196 (“This language would appear to preclude any possibility that individuals 
may benefit from [the Vienna Convention] when they travel abroad . . . .”). 
 83. See id. at 196–97 (reasoning that the plain language of Article 36 and the purpose of the 
Vienna Convention—establishing consular rights—indicate that Article 36 does not confer an 
individual right). 
 84. See id. at 198 (“[T]he implementation of the treaty by the federal government is wholly 
different from the implication that it may be enforced in court by individual detainees.”). 
 85. See id. at 197 (citing United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–66 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
 86. Id. at 198. 
 87. 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 88. Id. at 419–21. 
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police never informed him that he could contact the German 
consulate.89 The district court’s decision in this case is representative 
of the judgments recognizing an individual right under Article 
36(1)(b).90 
Reviewing the plain language of the Vienna Convention, the 
district court expressed that it was “difficult to imagine ‘. . . language 
that more unequivocally establishe[d] that the protections of Article 
36(1)(b) belong to the individual national, and that the failure to 
promptly notify him/her of these rights constitutes a violation of these 
entitlements by the detaining authority.’”91 Like the ICJ in LaGrand, 
the district court based its conclusion on the reference to “his rights” 
in Article 36(1)(b).92 Continuing its plain language interpretation, the 
district court dismissed the section of the preamble that the Fifth 
Circuit found dispositive in Jimenez-Nava. The district court 
concluded that the preamble merely clarified that the Convention’s 
consular relations rights belonged to states rather than their 
individual consular officers and that this clarification had no effect on 
individual foreign nationals’ rights under the treaty.93 The treaty’s 
drafting history and its application since ratification confirmed the 
district court’s conclusion that the Vienna Convention confers an 
individual right to consular notification:94 the treaty’s drafters had 
been immensely concerned about individual rights95 and, since 
ratification, the United States and other nations had recognized an 
individual right in practice.96 
 
 89. Id. at 421. 
 90. E.g., United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 91. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 72 (1st Cir. 
2000)).  
 92. See id. (“This ‘text emphasizes that the right of consular notice . . . is the citizen’s.’” 
(quoting Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. 
Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998))). 
 93. See id. (“[W]hen taken in the context of the treaty as a whole, the Preamble’s reference 
to ‘individuals’ is best understood as referring to consular officials rather than civilian foreign 
nationals.”). 
 94. See id. at 425 (“[The travaux préparatoires and the treaty’s operation in practice] 
affirm[] the interpretation that the [Vienna Convention] was intended to confer individual 
rights.”). 
 95. See id. at 425–26 (“[C]ommittee and plenary meeting debates on the [Vienna 
Convention] reflect widespread concern with the question of individual rights.”). 
 96. See id. at 426–27 (providing examples of other nations’ interpretations of the Vienna 
Convention and explaining compliance procedures established in the United States). 
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c. The Vienna Convention Does Not Confer a Fundamental 
Right: Some Agreement among the Federal Courts. Despite the 
disagreement about whether Article 36 confers an individual right, 
the federal courts concur about the scope of the right if it does exist. 
They agree that the right is equivalent to a right created by federal 
statute,97 which means that the right is not a fundamental right. The 
Fourth Circuit explained that, even if Article 36 confers an individual 
right, it is not a constitutional right: 
[E]ven if the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations could be 
said to create individual rights (as opposed to setting out the rights 
and obligations of signatory nations), it certainly does not create 
constitutional rights. Although states may have an obligation under 
the Supremacy Clause to comply with the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention, the Supremacy Clause does not convert violations of 
treaty provisions (regardless whether those provisions can be said to 
create individual rights) into violations of constitutional rights. Just 
as a state does not violate a constitutional right merely by violating a 
federal statute, it does not violate a constitutional right merely by 
violating a treaty.98 
This statement reflects the weight of authority in American law about 
the nature of the Article 36(1)(b) right. The federal courts maintain 
that, although the ratification of the Vienna Convention imported 
Article 36(1)(b) into the supreme law of the United States, the right 
to consular communication does not achieve constitutional status. 
II.  AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
Federal courts have interpreted Article 36(1)(b) contradictorily. 
Some courts have concluded that this provision gives detained foreign 
nationals a right to notification that they can contact their consuls for 
assistance,99 whereas other courts have determined that the treaty 
only gives consuls a right to assist their detained foreign nationals.100 
These inconsistent interpretations stem from the nature of the 
document being interpreted. Treaties are contracts among national 
governments enforceable against the governments through political 
 
 97. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“Our constitution declares a 
treaty . . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature . . . .”).  
 98. Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 99. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.  
 100. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.  
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and diplomatic channels.101 As such, treaties generally do not grant 
rights to individuals.102 Self-executing treaties, however, are an 
exception to this general rule.103 Self-executing treaties, which do not 
require Congress to pass additional legislation for implementation 
and go into force immediately upon ratification, may confer 
individual rights.104 The Vienna Convention is indisputably a self-
executing treaty,105 and it may fit into the individual right exception. 
To determine whether the Vienna Convention falls into the 
individual right exception, this Part interprets Article 36(1)(b) 
according to canons of treaty interpretation. Section A examines the 
plain language of Article 36(1)(b), which is the first step in all treaty 
interpretation.106 Although the plain language of Article 36(1)(b) 
seemingly provides a definitive meaning, Section B proceeds to the 
next step in treaty interpretation and explores the Vienna 
Convention’s travaux préparatoires—the treaty equivalent of 
legislative history.107 Finally, Section C completes the interpretive 
analysis by considering how the United States and other countries 
have implemented the Vienna Convention. Evidence is adduced that, 
along with the recognition that a self-executing treaty may create 
individual rights, strongly suggests that Article 36(1)(b) confers an 
individual right to consular notification. This analysis of the Vienna 
Convention’s plain language, legislative history, and practical 
implementation—together with the recognition that a self-executing 
treaty may create individual rights—strongly suggests that Article 
36(1)(b) confers an individual right to consular notification. 
 
 101. See United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (characterizing 
treaties as contracts enforced by the nations that are parties to them). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[E]ven where a 
treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state[,] . . . it is traditionally held 
that any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international law, those of the states 
and . . . individual rights are only derivative through the states.”). 
 103. Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 147, 
155 (1999). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 185, 596 U.N.T.S. at 376 (proclaiming 
entry into force on December 24, 1969); Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 564 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Rel., S. Exec. Rep. No. 90–9, 91st 
Cong. at 5.  
 106. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341.  
 107. See id. art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (explaining the circumstances under which it is 
appropriate to consider the travaux préparatoires). 
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A. Plain Language 
The Vienna Convention’s plain language indicates that an 
individual right exists under Article 36(1)(b). This provision contains 
a reference to “his rights,”108 which appears nowhere else in the treaty. 
The use of this special language signals that the purpose of this 
provision differs from that of the rest of the treaty. The conspicuous 
addition of this language belies the argument that Article 36(1)(b) 
only effectuates a consulate’s right to assist its foreign national. The 
rights of the consul could have been provided for in the treaty without 
using the “his rights” language.109 The standard “consular post,”110 
“sending state,”111 and “receiving state”112 language that appears in 
Article 36(1)(b) would have sufficed. The addition of the “his rights” 
language, in the context of the entire treaty and by its own terms, is 
strong evidence that Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right.113 
The “his rights” language of Article 36(1)(b) is not necessarily 
undone by the Vienna Convention’s preamble in the way that the 
Fifth Circuit maintained.114 The preamble states that the purpose of 
such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to 
ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on 
behalf of their respective States.115 Instead of indicating that the 
Vienna Convention does not give foreign nationals an individual 
right, this language likely means that the “privileges and immunities” 
bestowed on consular officers are the means of effecting consular 
responsibilities, not mere personal benefits.116 This caveat is necessary 
to justify the Vienna Convention’s tax exemptions and special 
 
 108. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. See supra notes 26, 92 and accompanying text. 
 114. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262; see supra 
notes 77–86 and accompanying text.  
 115. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.  
 116. See United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (1999) (“[I]t appears that the 
purpose of [the preamble] is not to restrict the individual notification rights of foreign nationals, 
but to make clear that the Convention’s purpose is to ensure the smooth functioning of consular 
posts in general, not to provide special treatment for individual consular officials.”); see also 
Emily Deck Harrill, Note, Exorcising the Ghost: Finding a Right and a Remedy in Article 36 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 55 S.C. L. REV. 569, 578 (2004) (“The preamble, 
viewed in context, simply recognizes that consuls are not afforded the immunities outlined in 
the treaty as personal benefits.”). 
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protections for consular officers.117 Nothing in the treaty’s plain 
language indicates that the preamble’s reference to individuals is not 
intended to encompass foreign nationals detained abroad. In fact, the 
actual operation of the Vienna Convention suggests otherwise. 
Benefits to individual foreign nationals are necessary byproducts of 
consular relations; when a country negotiates visa rights for its 
citizens or visits a national in jail, these individuals will necessarily 
derive benefits from the conduct of consular relations.118 
Consequently, the preamble to the Vienna Convention cannot 
logically be interpreted to deny benefits to foreign nationals. 
Irrespective of the “no individual benefit” language in the preamble, 
Article 36(1)(b) likely confers an individual right. 
B. Drafting 
The Vienna Convention’s travaux préparatoires underpin Article 
36(1)(b)’s plain language.119 The records of the International Law 
Commission120 and the Vienna Conference121 show that the treaty’s 
drafters sought to draft a provision that would “adequately 
safeguard[] individual freedom and the exercise of consular 
functions.”122 The Vienna Conference delegates adopted the final 
version of Article 36(1)(b) believing that “the right given to 
 
 117. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 32, 21 U.S.T. at 98, 596 U.N.T.S. at 288 
(taxation); id. art. 31, 21 U.S.T. at 97, 596 U.N.T.S. at 288 (inviolability of consular premises). 
 118. See, e.g., id. art. 5(d), 21 U.S.T. at 83, 596 U.N.T.S. at 268 (explaining the consular 
function of issuing visas); id. art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292 (“[C]onsular 
officers shall have the right to visit a national . . . who is in prison, custody or detention . . . .”). 
 119. See Summary Records of the 13th Session, [1961] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 33, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1961 (“The consul’s freedom to communicate with his nationals, and their right 
to communicate with their consul, constituted the cornerstone of the whole structure of consular 
relations.”). 
 120. The Internal Law Commission—thirty-four international lawyers elected by the United 
Nations General Assembly as representatives of the world’s principal legal systems—codifies 
customary international law and promotes its progressive development. MALANCZUK, supra 
note 42, at 61. The Commission drafts treaties and prepares reports that summarize 
international law. Id. 
 121. The Vienna Conference convened in March 1963 pursuant to United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 1685. G.A. Res. 1685, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 61–62, 
U.N. Doc. A/4843 (1961). The Secretary-General convoked the Conference of plenipotentiaries 
to consider the articles on consular relations drafted by the International Law Commission and 
to adopt a consular convention based upon them. Id. The Vienna Convention resulted. See 
supra note 2 and accompanying text.   
 122. 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records, at 82, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 25/16, U.N. Sales. No. 63.X.2 (1963) [hereinafter Official Records]. 
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consulates implied a corresponding right for nationals.”123 The 
proponents of Article 36(1)(b) drafted the “his rights” language to 
establish consular notification as an individual right.124 The passage of 
the provision indicates that a majority of delegates either sought to 
confer an individual right or at least acquiesced to doing so. The 
travaux préparatoires demonstrate that one of the reasons for 
adopting Article 36 in its present form was to give foreign nationals 
an individual right to consular notification. This is compelling 
evidence that the courts should recognize an individual right.  
The debates preceding the adoption of another provision—
Article 36(1)(c)—also suggest that the drafters of the Vienna 
Convention wanted to provide an individual right. The drafters 
debated whether Article 36(1)(c) would require notification of 
consuls automatically upon the arrest of foreign nationals or only 
upon a detainee’s request.125 Notably, the American delegate opposed 
an automatic notification provision because such a provision “[would] 
not recognize the freedom of action of the detained person.”126 
Because “[t]he object . . . was to protect the rights of the national 
concerned,”127 the delegates ultimately chose to draft a discretionary 
Article 36(1)(c).128 Under the provision, an arresting state must notify 
a detained foreign national’s consul only if the foreign national 
requests notification. Concomitant with the right to notification is the 
right to know that consular assistance is available: foreign nationals 
can exercise their right to ask arresting states to contact their 
consulates only if they are aware of this right.129 It follows that the 
 
 123. Id. at 333.  
 124. See id. at 83–84: 
The language of the [first-mentioned proposal] was unacceptable as it stood, 
because it could give rise to abuses and misunderstanding. It could well make the 
provisions of article 36 ineffective because the person arrested might not be aware 
of his rights. . . . For those reasons . . . it was essential to introduce a provision to 
the effect that the authorities of the receiving State should inform the person 
concerned without delay of his rights . . . . 
 125. Id. at 337 (debating between “[t]he absolute and unconditional obligation of the 
authorities of the receiving State to notify the sending State’s consul if a national of that State 
was . . . detained” and “the idea . . . that consuls should be notified only when the person 
concerned so requested”).  
 126. Id. at 38.  
 127. Id. at 337.  
 128. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292. 
 129. See Official Records, supra note 122, at 84 (“[I]t was essential to introduce a provision 
to the effect that the authorities of the receiving State should inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights . . . .”).  
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drafters’ adoption of Article 36(1)(c) conferred upon foreign 
nationals the right to learn from arresting states that they may ask for 
their consuls’ aid.130 Therefore, the history of Article 36(1)(c), when 
taken together with that of Article 36(1)(b), strongly indicates that 
foreign nationals hold an individual right to learn from arresting 
states that they may contact their consuls for assistance. 
C. Practice 
Nations’ implementation of Article 36(1)(b) further supports the 
conclusion that Article 36(1)(b) confers an individual right. In 
practice, the United States has never denied that foreign nationals 
possess an individual right under Article 36(1)(b).131 The State 
Department acknowledges the foreign national’s “right to have his 
consular officials notified of his arrest or detention.”132 The State 
Department incorporates this right into its domestic policy, 
undertaking efforts to insure that it “advise[s] the foreign national of 
this right of his.”133 These efforts include federal regulations134 and 
official missives to the states.135 These domestic initiatives cannot be 
dismissed as mere efforts to comply with the treaty because the 
position taken by a federal agency charged with effectuating a given 
right is owed special deference.136 Furthermore, the State 
Department’s domestic policy counters its opposition to challenges 
brought by foreign nationals under Article 36(1)(b) because “the 
litigation position of the State Department may not be entitled to as 
great weight as its nonlitigation policy approach to interpreting the 
[Vienna Convention].”137 Thus, the State Department’s domestic 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. See Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing 
the State Department’s efforts to comply with the Vienna Convention). 
 132. William H. Taft IV, U.S. Dep’t of State Legal Advisor, Remarks to the National 
Association of Attorneys General (Mar. 20, 2003) (emphasis added), available at 
http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2003/030321/epf516.htm.  
 133. Id. (emphasis added).  
 134. Notification of Consular Officers upon the Arrest of Foreign Nationals, 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 
(2005); Apprehension, custody, and detention, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2005). 
 135. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4 (“This booklet contains instructions 
and guidance relating to the arrest and detention of foreign nationals. . . . The instructions and 
guidance herein should be followed by all . . . state[] and local government officials, whether law 
enforcement, judicial, or other.”).   
 136. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–66 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 137. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 427 n.6 (noting that nonlitigation policy should be 
accorded more weight than conflicting litigation policy). 
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initiatives weigh heavily in favor of recognizing an individual right 
under Article 36(1)(b). 
Other signatory nations also recognize, at least at the 
policymaking level, an individual right to consular notification under 
Article 36(1)(b), as evidenced by the amici curiae submissions to 
international tribunals and U.S. courts.138 In litigation in which they 
had no vested interest, eighteen European nations and eight Central 
and South American countries proclaimed that their domestic laws 
recognize an individual right under Article 36(1)(b).139  
This recognition by other signatories and parties to the treaty 
presses the United States also to recognize an individual right. 
Without effectuating foreign nationals’ Article 36(1)(b) right, the 
United States cannot continue to use the Vienna Convention to 
further the interests of its citizenry abroad.140 Reciprocity demands 
that the United States recognize an individual right under Article 
36(1)(b). This compelling policy consideration, along with the Vienna 
Convention’s plain language and its drafting and implementation 
histories, indicates that foreign nationals hold what should be a 
judicially cognizable right. 
III.  A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
The inquiry into whether Article 36(1)(b) confers an individual 
right begs the additional question of whether the right, if it exists, is 
fundamental in scope. In American jurisprudence, fundamental rights 
are those rights that have “a value . . . essential to individual liberty in 
our society.”141 They “comprise a subset, or special part, of the 
 
 138. See id. at 426 (noting that Argentina, Canada, Mexico, and Paraguay submitted amici 
curiae briefs); Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 336 (same).  
 139. See id. (noting that Argentina, Paraguay, Canada, and Mexico submitted amici curiae 
briefs); see also Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 140–41 (noting that eighteen states, 
through the European Union and the European Commission, submitted amici curiae briefs in 
five death penalty cases in the United States); Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 336 
(noting that Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and the 
Dominican Republic submitted amici curiae briefs).  
 140. See Linda J. Springrose, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens 
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 185, 197 
(1999) (noting that the Vienna Convention’s reciprocal nature could imperil the protection of 
U.S. citizens if the U.S. government failed to meet its obligations under the Vienna 
Convention).  
 141. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7, at 433 (6th 
ed. 2000). 
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concept of liberty.”142 Rights recognized as fundamental include the 
right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a 
speedy trial, the right to confront adverse witnesses, and the right “to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have 
excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized.”143 These 
fundamental rights are, of course, anchored in the Bill of Rights. 
Nonetheless, not all fundamental rights are enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights; they may have “no specific textual basis in the 
Constitution.”144 Cases such as Roe v. Wade,145 Griswold v. 
Connecticut,146 Griffin v. Illinois,147 and, arguably, Lawrence v. Texas148 
recognize as fundamental certain rights that are merely implied or 
derived from rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, even 
in the absence of a perfect fit with the Bill of Rights, a fundamental 
right may be recognized under standards articulated by the Supreme 
Court: 
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at 
large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. 
Rather, they must look to the “traditions and [collective] conscience 
of our people” to determine whether a principle is “so rooted 
[there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.” The inquiry is whether a 
right involved “is of such a character that it cannot be denied 
without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions’ . . . .” 
“Liberty” also “gains content from the emanations of . . . specific 
[constitutional] guarantees” and “from experience with the 
requirements of a free society.”149  
 
 142. Id. § 11.5.  
 143. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).  
 144. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 141, § 11.7.  
 145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion).  
 146. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy). 
 147. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to obtain a court transcript without cost to qualify for 
appellate review). 
 148. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (right to private sexual conduct). Lawrence v. Texas is arguably a 
fundamental rights case. The Court recognized a protected liberty interest under the substantive 
due process rubric. The Court merely stopped short of labeling the right to private sexual 
conduct as a fundamental right.  
 149. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493–94 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (alterations and omissions in 
original)). 
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The Supreme Court has never considered whether the individual 
right conferred by Article 36—which this Part assumes to exist—is 
fundamental under these standards.150 The lower federal courts have 
concluded that the right is not fundamental in scope,151 reasoning 
summarily that the Supremacy Clause places treaty rights on par with 
statutory rights, not constitutional ones.152 
But the parity between rights created by treaty and by statute 
does not automatically mean that the right to consular notification is 
not fundamental. The right may nevertheless be fundamental if it is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”153 and ‘implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”154 Substantive due process could 
sweep in the right to consular notification and classify it as a 
fundamental right if society’s collective sense of liberty required that 
foreign nationals receive greater safeguards than the criminal justice 
system provides to American defendants. Whether society’s sense of 
due process encompasses the right to consular notification is 
unknown, however, because no federal court has ever analyzed the 
right to consular notification within the substantive due process 
rubric.155 
The federal courts’ refusal to perform the substantive due 
process inquiry may result from the federal judiciary’s retrenchment 
of substantive due process: substantive due process is out vogue.156 
Likewise, the literature has used the courts’ curtailment of 
substantive due process to dismiss summarily the fundamental rights 
argument; legal scholarship has shied away from substantive due 
process analysis because of a perception that courts are hesitant to 
recognize new rights as fundamental.157  
 
 150. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 151. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Glucksberg outlines the two-step 
substantive due process analysis. 
 154. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). 
 155. See supra Part I.B. 
 156. See Joshua A. Brook, Note, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations 
of the Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 
595–96 n.108 (2004) (“Some have even argued that consular rights should be deemed 
‘fundamental rights’ implied by the Bill of Rights but it is doubtful the Court would accept this 
argument given its general retreat from substantive due process.”). 
 157. See id. (same). 
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This reticence is unjustified: the “general retreat from 
substantive due process” is more perceived than real.158 In Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland,159 the Supreme Court affirmatively denied that 
it was retreating from substantive due process;160 Justice Powell 
emphasized that the excesses of the Lochner era counseled only 
“caution and restraint,” not the “abandonment” of substantive due 
process.161 In Washington v. Glucksberg,162 the Court reiterated that it 
“must . . . ‘exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break 
new ground in this field,’”163 but at no time has the Court signaled a 
complete departure from substantive due process. Undoubtedly, “the 
United States Supreme Court still follows the doctrine when 
determining unenumerated rights issues.”164 
Because substantive due process remains a viable legal doctrine, 
it should be applied to the right to consular notification. This Part 
explores whether constitutionally protected liberty should include the 
right to consular notification. Section A considers the history, 
tradition, and practice of consular notification in the United States, 
and Section B looks beyond history and tradition to determine if 
society’s modern conception of due process includes the right to 
consular notification. These Sections together demonstrate that the 
right to consular notification is a candidate for constitutional 
protection. 
A. History, Tradition, and Practice 
The starting point165 of a substantive due process analysis is an 
examination of the history, tradition, and practice behind the right to 
consular notification.166 The point in time from which courts must 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 163. Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
 164. Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining 
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 181 
(2003). 
 165. The substantive due process analysis also requires “a ‘careful description’ of the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). This prong can be omitted from the analysis here because a careful 
description of the right to consular notification is easy—foreign nationals’ right upon arrest to 
notification that they may contact their home countries’ consulates for assistance. 
 166. See supra notes 153 and accompanying text.  
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trace this history, tradition, and practice is unclear, although Justice 
Scalia characterized it as a demanding inquiry in his Lawrence 
dissent.167 In Ingraham v. Wright,168 the majority charted the history of 
corporal punishment all the way back to Blackstone and the 
American Revolution,169 but, in Lawrence, the majority focused on 
the history of sodomy laws since 1961.170 The Supreme Court has not 
established a historical benchmark for constitutional protection. 
Without a standard for measuring history, tradition, and practice, one 
can only make an informed guess about whether the right to consular 
notification is so culturally and legally established that the Supreme 
Court should incorporate it into due process. 
A survey of the history and tradition of consular notification 
suggests that the right could meet any of the historical standards that 
the Supreme Court previously has employed in substantive due 
process inquiries. “[C]onsular relations have been established 
between peoples since ancient times,”171 and the State Department 
has identified consular notification as a “basic obligation” of 
conducting consular relations.172 Because consular notification is such 
an integral part of consular relations, one can readily assume that the 
history of consular relations and the history of consular notification 
are coterminous. This shared history is quite long, as the preamble to 
the Vienna Convention acknowledges.173 Even before the Vienna 
Convention provided for consular notification, the norms of 
customary international law required countries to initiate some sort 
of consular communication when they detained foreign nationals, 
either by giving foreign nationals the option of contacting their 
consulates or by contacting the consulates directly.174 The United 
States subscribed to these norms long before it accepted the consular 
notification requirement by ratifying the Vienna Convention.175 In 
 
 167. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2489 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly 
fundamental rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ qualify for 
anything other than rational-basis scrutiny . . . .” (quoting Washington, 521 U.S. at 721)).  
 168. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 169. Id. at 659–63. 
 170. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.  
 171. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
 172. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 44.  
 173. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
 174. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 42 (“The [Vienna Convention] to a large 
extent codified customary international law . . . .”).  
 175. See id. 
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addition to subscribing to the consular notification norms in 
customary international law,176 the State Department negotiated 
bilateral consular relations treaties that provided for reciprocal 
consular notification.177 These agreements were typically friendship, 
commerce, and navigation treaties through which the United States 
formalized the consular relations that it had established under 
customary international law.178 The United States’ strong historical 
commitment to consular notification is best evidenced by mandatory 
notification agreements (MNA).179 An MNA is a treaty under which 
the United States commits to notify another country’s consulate 
whenever it detains one of the other country’s foreign nationals.180 
The United States had such a treaty with Belgium as early as 1880.181 
The MNAs’ automatic consular notification provisions attest to the 
importance of the assistance that consulates can offer to detained 
foreign nationals, and the United States’ historic use of these treaties 
attests to the long history of consular notification in this country.  
This history strongly suggests that the boundaries of due process 
should expand to encompass the right to consular notification. It is a 
history at least as compelling as the history underpinning the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence. And the ancient roots of 
consular relations are not unlike the archaic origins of corporal 
punishment.182 The Supreme Court is willing to grant constitutional 
protection to rights deeply embedded in this nation’s history.183 
Ultimately, only the Supreme Court can determine what constitutes 
embedment, but the practice of notifying foreign nationals about 
consular assistance or contacting the consulate directly extends 
throughout United States history to the earliest interactions among 
the peoples of sovereign states. This history at least merits 
 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. U.S. Dep’t of State, Founding of the Department of State, 1789, at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/14316.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal).  
 179. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 43.  
 180. The International Justice Project, Foreign Nationals: Bilateral Mandatory Notification 
Treaties, at www.internationaljusticeproject.org/nationals_bil.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 181. Id. 
 182. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659–63 (1977) (reviewing the history of corporal 
punishment). 
 183. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (1965) 
(noting that the Framers recognized rights beyond those specified in the Bill of Rights). 
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consideration by the federal courts, which should recognize the right 
as a possible fundamental right and conduct a thorough substantive 
due process analysis. 
B. Modern Conceptions of Liberty 
Analyzing the history, tradition, and practice that underlie a right 
is only the first prong of the substantive due process analysis.184 
“History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the 
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”185 Therefore, the 
substantive due process analysis also requires consideration of 
society’s modern conceptions of due process—what rights should now 
be included in the constitutional conception of liberty.186 Before the 
right to consular notification can qualify as fundamental, its place in 
society’s modern vision of due process must be examined. The 
Supreme Court alternatively has described this second prong of the 
substantive due process inquiry as a determination of whether the 
right is so “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”187 that “neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed,”188 or whether it “is 
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those 
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions.’”189 These are iterations of the 
same basic question: Must this right be recognized as fundamental to 
maintain the American conception of constitutional freedom? 
This question may be answered affirmatively even if the right  
can be recognized as fundamental only by implication.190  
The Supreme Court has recognized fundamental rights—such as the 
right to privacy191 and the right to raise one’s child as one sees  
 
 184. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (noting that history and tradition 
should be the starting, but not the ending, point (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 185. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 186. See id. at 571–72 (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are 
of most relevance here.”). 
 187. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). 
 188. Id. at 326. 
 189. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))).  
 190. See id. at 482–83 (“Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less 
secure.”). 
 191. See id. (recognizing the right to privacy). 
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fit192—that are only derivative of express constitutional protections;193 
fundamental rights need not be explicitly guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights.194 
Along these lines, courts could derive a fundamental right to 
consular notification from the Bill of Rights.195 Arguably, notions of 
privacy and autonomy should provide constitutional protection to the 
right to consular notification even though this right is not expressly 
within the Constitution’s ambit. This argument depends on the 
disadvantages faced by foreign nationals in the American criminal 
justice system196 and on the idea that peripheral constitutional rights 
must be recognized to make enumerated constitutional rights more 
secure.197 Griswold and Roe lend precedential support—a protectable 
right to privacy must exist in a free society. 
But reliance on the right-to-privacy cases may be misplaced. 
These cases recognize a right to privacy rooted in individual liberty 
and autonomy—a right that the Supreme Court has been careful to 
contain.198 This right, which has had little generative effect in recent 
years,199 may be a shaky constitutional basis for implying a right to 
consular notification. The relationship between a right to consular 
notification and notions of autonomy and liberty is too attenuated: 
although the right to consular notification does implicate foreign 
nationals’ autonomy, deprivations of the right to consular notification 
restrain foreign nationals’ physical liberty more than their freedom of 
choice. Furthermore, Justice Scalia suggested in his Lawrence dissent 
that Glucksberg has eroded the Griswold line of cases.200 
A better argument would rely on “emanations [from] specific 
[constitutional] guarantees,”201 namely, the Sixth Amendment.202 The 
 
 192. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing parents’ right to raise 
their children as they see fit). 
 193. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483–84 (explaining the penumbras of guaranteed rights). 
 194. See id. (explaining how “various guarantees create zones of privacy” beyond specific 
Bill of Rights provisions). 
 195. See Springrose, supra note 140, at 199–203. 
 196. See infra notes 209–218 and accompanying text.  
 197. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83. 
 198. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 723–28 (1997) (declining to derive from 
the right to privacy a right to commit suicide or to assist another to commit suicide). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 201. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 202. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Supreme Court has suggested in criminal procedure cases that rights 
can be implied from the existing right to counsel under the Palko v. 
Connecticut203 standard: rights are fundamental if they are “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,”204 such that “neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if they were sacrificed.”205 In Griffin, the Court noted that 
the Constitution does not mention any right to a free transcript for 
appellate review, but the Court recognized the right as fundamental, 
stating, “[O]ur own constitutional guaranties . . . allow no invidious 
discriminations between persons and different groups of 
persons. . . [A]ll people charged with crime must, so far as the law is 
concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every 
American court.’”206 A Palko argument was also made by the 
dissenters in Betts v. Brady,207 who rightly argued that “[a] practice 
cannot be reconciled with ‘common and fundamental ideas of fairness 
and right,’ which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of 
conviction merely because of their poverty.”208 
This argument may be equally applicable in the cases of foreign 
nationals. To use the language of the Betts dissenters, “[a] . . . practice 
[may not be reconcilable] with ‘common and fundamental ideas of 
fairness and right,’ which subjects innocent men to increased dangers 
of conviction merely because of their”209 alienage. Like indigents, 
foreign nationals may face “increased dangers of conviction”210 
because of a cultural gap.211 This cultural gap, characterized by 
language differences and an alien criminal justice system, may 
prevent foreign nationals from fully understanding their legal rights, 
when arresting authorities explain their legal rights to them.212 For 
instance, foreign nationals, unfamiliar with the American adversary 
system, may not appreciate that they are “not required to make any 
 
 203. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 204. Id. at 325. 
 205. Id. at 326. 
 206. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). 
 207. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 208. Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 473).  
 209. Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 473). 
 210. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). 
 211. See Springrose, supra note 140, at 195–96 (explaining that cultural differences 
sometimes lead foreign nationals unwittingly to jeopardize their own defenses). 
 212. See John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging 
Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a Defense Tool, THE CHAMPION, 
Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 30.  
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statement to the police or prosecutors”213 or that they cannot be 
compelled to testify.214 Instead, foreign nationals may follow practices 
from their home countries, which are incompatible with the United 
States’ adversary system. The Paraguayan national in Breard, for 
example, confessed to rape and murder, in spite of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, because the courts of his home country offered 
leniency for confessions.215  
For several reasons, the American right to counsel cannot always 
correct such misunderstandings of the legal system. First, many 
foreign nationals may not know that they have a right to an attorney. 
Furthermore, even if foreign nationals have attorneys appointed for 
them, the attorneys may not be able to bridge the cultural gap on 
their own. Foreign nationals simply may not trust their appointed 
attorneys enough to cooperate in an effective defense.216 This scenario 
is especially likely when foreign nationals do not understand the 
attorney-client privilege.217 Similarly, the other protections of criminal 
due process may fail to bridge the cultural gap because the safeguards 
themselves are undermined by cultural differences.218 Consequently, 
only “[a]n interested consul can provide the bridge”219 to close the 
cultural gap effectively. Consular assistance is needed to effectuate 
due process for foreign nationals and to place them on par with other 
criminal defendants. Only consular assistance will ward off the 
increased dangers of conviction faced by foreign nationals, which 
qualifies the right to consular notification for fundamental status 
under the Palko-Betts analysis.220 The right to consular notification 
should be recognized as fundamental because allowing foreign 
nationals to stand trial without consular assistance to help them 
overcome their cultural disadvantages does not square with society’s 
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.221 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Springrose, supra note 140, at 195–96 (explaining the impact of culture on the 
events of Breard). 
 216. Sims & Carter, supra note 212. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See supra notes 201–19 and accompanying text. 
 221. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority 
opinion at 473), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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The Palko-Betts analysis provides a strong constitutional basis 
for the right to consular notification. The right could be implied from 
a specific constitutional provision—the Sixth Amendment—which 
gives it the strength of textual support. Furthermore, there is a strong 
connection between the Sixth Amendment and the right to consular 
notification because they are both assurances of fairness in the 
criminal justice system. Given the existence of a textual basis from 
which to imply a fundamental right to consular notification, there is 
no need to resort to the individual autonomy argument,222 which is not 
as strong as a textual implication argument based directly on the Sixth 
Amendment. 
What is most significant for the purposes of this Note is that 
there exist two plausible arguments for implying a fundamental right 
to consular notification. The mere existence and viability of these 
arguments suggest that the right to consular notification is a 
contender for fundamental status. Whether it deserves constitutional 
protection should be determined through a comprehensive 
substantive due process analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Article 36(1)(b) most likely grants individual foreign nationals a 
right to notification that their consuls may assist them. Even though 
treaties do not generally create individual rights, profuse evidence 
suggests that the Vienna Convention is an exception to this general 
rule. As a self-executing treaty, the Vienna Convention is capable of 
granting individual rights, and the treaty’s language and drafting 
history indicate that it does so. The treaty explicitly references an 
individual, and the drafting history indicates that the drafters 
intended to vest an individual right in foreign nationals. The strength 
of this evidence should lead to a uniform recognition of an individual 
right by the American courts and the criminal justice system. 
Moreover, the judicial system should consider recognizing the 
individual right as a fundamental right. Fundamental rights can be 
derivative of or implied from enumerated constitutional protections if 
the rights are sufficiently underpinned by history, tradition, and 
practice and conform to society’s modern conceptions of due process. 
Strong historical evidence suggests that consular notification could 
meet any historical benchmark established for fundamental rights. 
 
 222. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.  
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Consular notification is consistent with society’s modern conceptions 
of liberty because it is a fairness guarantee in the criminal justice 
system. Given that Article 36(1)(b) was intended to protect foreign 
nationals in alien criminal justice systems and that the concept of 
consular notification extends throughout American history, the right 
in Article 36(1)(b) should at least merit recognition as a potential 
fundamental right, and violations of this right should prompt an 
exacting substantive due process inquiry. Foreign nationals facing 
convictions and punishments in the United States deserve a careful 
consideration of the right that the Vienna Convention arguably gives.  
 
